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Security Guards and Counter-terrorism:
tourism and gaps in terrorism prevention
Luke Howie
Monash University, Australia
luke.howie@monash.edu
Organisations operating in the tourism industry are high priority targets for terrorists. In
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks tourism destinations, hotels and modes of public
transportation have regularly been targeted by terrorists seeking to convey their violent
message. As such, leaders and managers in the tourism industry carefully plan their
security and counter-terrorism responses, often involving the hiring of security guards.
It is here that I believe a significant gap in counter-terrorism preparedness exists. I argue
that protecting tourism destinations is only possible if consideration is given to the
effectiveness of security guards and understanding that their well-being will impact
upon their ability to deliver security. I want to draw attention to the often ignored social
role of security guards. On 9/11, 42 security guards died whilst helping save the lives of
thousands. They performed their jobs admirably, despite being low-paid, underappreciated workers. In this paper I explore the social role of security guards in the
context of tourism security. By drawing on representations of security guards in popular
culture and reports on the state of the security guard industry, I argue that the lack of
attention on the quality and well-being of guards is a significant black-spot in tourism
security and terrorism preparedness.
Key Words: security guards, terrorism, first responders, preparedness.

Introduction: Terrorism and the tourism
industry
The tourism „industry‟ or „sector‟ continues to be a
highly attractive target for terrorists (Alexander, 2004:
151; Mansfeld, 1999: 30; Pizam & Mansfeld, 1996;
Sönmez & Graefe, 1998; Sönmez et al., 1999). Since
9/11 tourism destinations, hotels and modes of
transportation have regularly been the focus of terrorist
attacks. Where tourists can generally avoid at-risk
destinations by considering political strife in the
region, crime statistics and trends, terrorist attacks can
often be „inescapable‟ (Sönmez et al., 1999: 13).
Whilst terrorism is never random violence (see Howie,
2009a: 49), it is naturally difficult to avoid attacks
when they may occur in New York City, on the Madrid
commuter rail system or in the heart of London. The
island resort of Bali has been targeted twice in major
attacks, in 2002 and 2005, to devastating effect
(Henderson, 2003, 2004; Hitchcock & Putra, 2007).
The victims were affluent tourists, many of European,
Australian or North American nationality. While most
people with a television were able to follow the roundthe-clock media coverage of the London „7/7‟ attacks
in 2005, few paid much attention to the more deadly

attacks two weeks later in the coastal town of Sharm al
-Sheikh in Egypt where suicide bombers, targeting
tourists, killed 88 people (BBC News, 2005). In June
2014, terrorist organization al-Shebab stormed through
a coastal town in Kenya targeting a police station,
houses and hotels searching for „non-Muslims‟ (AFP,
2014: 27). In a statement following the attack, alShebab explained that the attacks will continue in
response to the Kenyan government‟s oppression of
Muslims and „warned tourists and foreigners to stay
out of the country‟. This attack occurred only eight
months after the Westgate shopping complex attack in
Nairobi (see paper in this volume by Schroeder et al.).
These examples of terrorists targeting tourism are only
the tip of the iceberg. Terrorists have also viewed
hotels (Stafford et al., 2002), public transport (Jenkins,
2001), sporting events (Toohey et al., 2003), city
centers (Coaffee, 2003; Howie, 2009a), and cultural
and religious attractions (Bhattarai et al., 2005) as
highly desirable targets.
The terrorist threat to tourism is not something unique
to the post-9/11 world. Pizam and Smith‟s (2000: 132)
research provides insight into the pre-9/11 effects of
terrorism in tourism locations and on the tourism
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industry between 1985 and 1998. They found that more
than half of the terrorist attacks on tourism destinations
occurred in the Middle East (54%), with Europe the
second most prevalent (27%). Of the attacks targeting
tourism locations, 71% of the victims were tourists (as
opposed to local workers and residents). The average
number of deaths per attack was 37, making terrorists
targeting tourism a particularly bloody form of
terrorism. Almost half of the attacks in tourism
locations were carried out in urban environments, with
a third occurring on modes of transport. In 45% of the
attacks, guns were used. In the aftermath of these
attacks, demand for tourism decreased for periods of
time averaging between one and six months.
For managers, leaders and employees of organizations
operating in the tourism industries, and for the local,
state and federal officials for whom tourism safety is a
priority, the threat of terrorism requires a security
response. In many situations and contexts, this will
involve a complex array of security systems and
practices including security technologies such as metal
and bomb detectors; close liaising with state
intelligence and policing authorities; close screening of
clients, customers and visitors; computer systems for
tracking and monitoring staff and visitors; and, most
importantly, a highly trained and dedicated team of
security guards without whom all the security
technology in the world is close to useless. It is here
that I believe a significant gap in counter-terrorism
preparedness persists. I argue that protecting tourism
destinations is only possible if consideration is given to
the effectiveness of security guards and understanding
that their well-being will impact upon their ability to
deliver security.
This paper has three sections. The first section
contextualises the paper, presenting current literature
on terrorism, tourism and security thinking. In section
two, I outline the key literature that informs my
understanding of the important role of security guards
in counter-terrorism security. Here I explore the
paradox that sees some of our most vulnerable
locations being protected by undervalued, overworked
and under-appreciated security staff. The existence of
this paradox, I argue, is a significant blind-spot in a
state‟s counter-terrorism efforts. In the third section, I
examine the social role of security guards in the public
imagination. Here I rely on representations of security
guards in popular culture and security guard stories
from the post-9/11 world. I conclude by arguing that
counter-terrorism solutions in tourism locations require
security staff be considered valuable and central to
community safety.
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Terrorism, Tourism and Security Thinking
Religious and pilgrimage tourism has become
increasingly insecure and uncertain in the post-9/11
world. This has been the case for two related reasons;
1) Travel to risky or potentially uncertain areas, as sites
of religion and pilgrimage may often be, is
increasingly securitised in the post-9/11 world, and
2) Sites of religion and pilgrimage, representing sites
that attract mass gathering of people, are often
considered highly attractive for would-be terrorists.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, people altered their
travelling habits. Indeed, as many Americans
abandoned air travel they took to their cars, which
resulted in sharp spikes in interstate road deaths across
the US (Mueller, 2006: 3). The air transport industry
was acutely affected, and tourism and related industries
paid a heavy price for the fear that swept through many
parts of the world (Alexander & Alexander, 2002;
Alexander, 2004).
Mueller (2006: 146) argues that terrorists will likely
continue to innovate in their efforts in spreading fear
and doubt. Their goal in selecting potential targets may
become „if a bomb goes off in one of those [places], it
can go off anywhere‟. Uncertainty, it seems, is their
weapon of choice. Mueller notes that whilst acts of
terrorism in the US have been mostly concentrated in
large cities, a number of locations not in major cities
have been targeted overseas, often in tourist areas.
Indeed, hotels, holiday destinations, sporting events
and the methods of transport to these locations have
been frequently targeted by groups seeking to send a
violent message to an audience.
The case of tourism in Nepal, where adventure and
pilgrimage tourism is a blended tourist experience that
shares similar security problems is outlined by
Bhattarai et al., in their 2005 work. As they argue,
tourism in Nepal was increasing rapidly up until
September 2001. In a nation where internal political
struggles and an under-developed state apparatus
meant that only the most adventurous tourists visited,
„the global social climate spawned by September 11‟
has had a devastating effect on its third world tourism:
Nepal exemplifies this situation, a country
where global terrorism, couple with the
ongoing domestic Maoist war, has wrecked its
image as a Shangri-La . . . The World Trade
Center disaster of 2001 not only increased the
scale and scope of international terrorist
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activity, but it ushered in the current US
administration‟s global “war on terrorism,”
significantly heightening concerns about
security almost everywhere (Bhattarai et al.,
2005: 670).
Nepal, and many places like it in the developing world,
was deeply affected by 9/11 through a heavy reduction
in tourism for a number of years following the attacks.
Yet, despite the age of terrorism, as security was
improved on passenger aircraft and most other forms of
mass transport, and technological innovation made
long distance travel quicker and more affordable, there
has been quick recovery in the travelling industries as
more people travel by plane than ever before, with the
numbers expected to increase over the next 20 years
(Jansen, 2014).
Reflecting on how the tourism industry has long
suffered at the hands of the terrorist threat, Pizam and
Smith (2000: 123) argue that since before the end of
the Cold War, a time which will be remembered by
terrorism studies scholars as the years when terrorist
organizations become aware of the transformative
potential of spectacular violence, terrorism has been a
part of the „travel and tourism landscape‟. Crisis and
risk managers began playing important roles in
organizations responsible for managing locations that
are regularly visited by travelers each year. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, terrorist attacks were having a
significant impact on the tourism industry, leading to
„steep declines‟ in demand for travel and
accommodation (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 124). A steep
increase in fear of terrorism targeting the tourism
industry led to reductions in foreign travel initially,
especially from the US to Europe, but was soon
followed by a slowing of terrorist acts and an
increasing demand for tourism services and products.
This, in turn, was followed by 9/11 – the worst nonstate act of terrorism in contemporary history which
was, for a time, devastating for the tourism and travel
sectors (Alexander & Alexander, 2002; Alexander,
2004). Airlines and air travel related industries were
acutely affected (Alexander, 2004: 155-156).
Korstanje and Clayton (2012: 10) argue that there is an
inherent tension that reveals the effectiveness of
terrorism as a weapon against tourism and tourismrelated targets. Tourism, the authors note, „involves
freedom of movement and travel, and is a fairly
effective way of disseminating cultural ideas and
practices‟. It is, however, precisely this freedom of
movement that places tourists in vulnerable positions.
When 88 Australians (out of a total of 202 victims)
were killed in the first Bali bombings in 2002, among
~ 40 ~

the stated grievances was the decadence of Western
tourists and their drunken behavior in the nightclub
districts where the bombs were detonated. It may be
that tourists are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism. And
when one considers the religious volatility that has
characterized so many parts of the world from North
Africa, the Middle East, to Northern and Southern
America and across Asia, tourism to religious sites and
site of pilgrimage are likely to carry a heightened
vulnerability as an unsecurable soft target that, if
attacked, sends a powerful and violent propaganda
message to witnesses throughout the world assuming
cameras capture the violence. Again, the ordinary habit
of photography conspires to render tourists ideal
targets of those who would use violence to achieve
their goals.
Mansfeld (1999: 32) argues that while the impact of
terrorism on tourism industries and destinations is
„unpredictable and highly differential‟, there are
several steps that tourism managers can undertake in
order to prepare for terrorism and the threat of
terrorism affecting their organizations. Mansfeld
(1999: 35-36) recommends that counter-terrorism in
tourism should be viewed as a „long-term process‟
involving the monitoring of trends in both tourism
demand and terrorism events; cooperation and
integration of all operations across related industries
and sectors including law enforcement, government
and intelligence organizations; representation from all
key stakeholders at the strategic level; information
sharing, especially on security and risk; and security
budgeting. A significant difficulty here is the loss of
will that often comes into play when people begin to
forget the impact and fear associated with major acts of
terror. As one senior manager in a public transport
organization described it, his company secures his
business to the extent that he can justify his and his
company‟s actions in the event of a post-attack legal
inquiry or royal commission (Howie, 2009a: 161).
Indeed, perception is key for understanding the damage
that terrorism causes and the impact on the tourism
industry. It is well understood in terrorism studies
scholarship that fear of terrorism has an impact far
beyond any actual damage that terrorism causes
(Friedland & Merari, 1985; Howie, 2012; Skoll, 2010).
This led Richard Clutterbuck (1977: 13) to argue in his
seminal Guerrillas and Terrorists that „the strongest
single factor which leads governments to give way to
terrorists, internationally or internally, is
television‟ (and see Howie, 2012: 33). Pizam and
Smith (2000: 125) believe that this same logic is at
play in the tourism industries:
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Fear and insecurity about the possibilities of
terrorism affect tourism demand, even when, in
fact, deaths and injuries from terrorism for US
citizens are statistically insignificant – less
likely to occur than being struck by lightning or
killed in an accident on the roads or at home.
At the same time, however, terrorism has
gained premier power and efficiency as a
political weapon through mass media coverage
and the exaggerated perceptions about traveler
safety and security that this perpetuates.
Understanding the role of the media is central to
understanding the nature and threat of terrorism. As
Mueller (2006: 2), argues terrorists kill on average „a
few hundred people a year‟. Around the same number
drown in US bathtubs each year. One astronomer puts
the „lifetime‟ risk of dying at the hands of terrorists
globally as „1 in 80,000‟. This is about the same
likelihood of dying in an asteroid or comet strike on
Earth (Harris in Mueller, 2006: 2). In the context of
tourism, Mawby (2000: 109) describes this as the „riskfear paradox‟ where tourists fear becoming victims of
crime or terrorism far beyond the calculated probability
that such victimization will occur. The media,
however, renders these probabilities meaningless.
There is even evidence that suggests this fear can reach
clinical levels of anxiety. In the weeks following 9/11,
Xanax prescriptions increased 9% across the US, and
22% in New York City (Stossel, 2014: 8-9). This trend
was repeated as the Global Financial Crisis neared. As
stock markets „went into free fall‟ prescriptions for anti
-anxiety and anti-depression medication and sleeping
pills increased sharply. As I have described throughout
my career, the media brings distant acts of international
terrorism into our living rooms and provides fertile
ground for deep seated anxieties to emerge within us,
leading to perceptions that we are, somehow,
personally threatened by terrorists. Or, as I have
argued, the media makes us all witnesses to terror
(Howie, 2009b; 2012; 2013). When it comes to
terrorism and security, perception matters. As
Korstanje (2009: 69-70) argues, it was not until the
9/11 attacks that risk perception theories became
popular in tourism and security research. Risk and
security is about fear and emotions.
Sites that receive visitors remain highly desirable
targets for would-be terrorists. Sites that many people
visit create bottle-necks and mass gatherings which,
from a terrorist‟s perspective, are an ideal “soft” target.
In Australia, „mass gatherings‟ are an important focus
of Australia‟s counterterrorism preparedness (National
Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2011). In this way, and
from a counter-terrorism security perspective, we can
~ 41 ~

potentially expand our understanding of pilgrimage
security to include any site to which people are
attracted at various or cyclical times of the year with
the purpose of culturally experiencing or engaging
locations that have a particular social, cultural or
religious significance. Such locations of cultural
pilgrimage include religious monuments and sites;
sporting events; musical events and performances;
adventure seeking locations like mountains, resorts,
oceans, beaches and rivers; and a host of other tourism
locations like major cities. All face similar security
dilemmas that require careful, counter-terrorism based,
security planning. As depicted in the security guardthemed comedy film, Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009),
security guards „detect, deter, observe and report‟.
Detect, deter, observe, report – it is a powerful
metaphor for officers who play a significant role in
public safety whilst having no greater power than an
ordinary citizens‟ arresting rights. Unlike police
officers, security guards can be prosecuted for
unlawful detention (Carlson, 1995: 67-68; Parfomak,
2004:4). They can detect problems, deter the offenders
if they can, watch and tell someone. However, as I will
show throughout this paper, in times of terror security
guards do far more than this. Indeed, on 9/11 security
guards were heroes and worked and died alongside
emergency services personnel. They did so with far
less acclaim, and for far less pay.

The Counter-terrorism Role of Security
Guards
The role of security guards in a nation‟s counterterrorism preparedness or a business‟ counter-terrorism
security is an issue that has not been widely studied or
well understood (but see Shearing & Stenning, 1983;
van Steden & Nalla, 2010). It became a matter of
public discussion when, in 2005, New York‟s city
council announced a proclamation that „Private
security officers displayed great courage and
professionalism as they risked their lives to maintain
order, evacuate thousands and help save lives‟ (United
Voice, 2011: 8). Once the dust had settled, 42 security
guards had lost their lives in the attacks on the Twin
Towers. Since security guards are such a ubiquitous
part of our safety-conscious culture I have been unable
to locate a reliable estimation of how many security
guards were on duty that day. What we do know is,
remarkably, more security guards were killed in the
attacks on the Twin Towers than NYPD police
officers, and they worked for far less pay, fewer
benefits and support, and with less social acclaim and
privilege in the community.
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The social significance of security guards has received
little attention in the sociology, terrorism studies, and
counter-terrorism studies literatures (but see Howie,
2012: 133-154; Alexander & Alexander, 2002: 55).
Studies of the role of security guards is almost
exclusively housed within criminological fields where
guards are viewed as law and order appendages (Sarre
& Prenzler, 1998, 2000, 2011), „private‟ or „plural‟
policing (Loader, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2006), or as
a criminalistic population themselves. The numerous
criminological contributions obfuscate what is the most
dangerous black spot in domestic counter-terrorism
functionality. To understand the role that security
guards play in counter-terrorism it is not enough to
consider their roles, practices, skills and behaviours as
keepers of social control and as private police. We also
need to consider their working conditions and
remunerations; the expectations that people have of
guards; their perceived social roles; their perceived
social value and importance/relevance; their symbolic
value; and their challenges, lives, well-being and health
(St. John, 1991; United Voice, 2011).
I argue that security guards have a significant place in
counter-terrorism security. It could be argued that
security guards are the first line of defense against
suicide bombers. We might also say that security
guards are the first first responders – already standing
guard at entrances to buildings, sporting events or in
the lobby of hotels when terrorists attempt their
attacks. Security guards are a visible and, I argue,
symbolic feature of counter-terrorism safeguards for
any organization as they work alongside police and
intelligence officers. As a US congressional report
showed, security guards „fill the gap‟ created by
limited public resources and insufficient numbers of
police (Parfomak, 2004: 5). Security guards, you see,
are a much cheaper way of providing security, safety
and the appearance of certainty (Howie, 2009a).
However, there is a dark underside for those who work
as security guards, often for demanding hours, little job
security and minimal reward. As one security guard at
an Australian defense base explains,
We‟re the first ones a terrorist or a maniac is
going to see. If they‟ve got a knife or a gun,
we‟re the people who will cop it (United Voice,
2011: 33).
Indeed, security guards are often the victims of terrorist
attacks. In fact, there are numerous examples of
security guards becoming victims of an attack due to
their successful execution of their role. It could be
argued that security guards face a terrible paradox – to
successfully prevent an attack and be among the dead,
~ 42 ~

or, do little to stop an attack, and survive it to the
detriment of those the guards are assigned to protect.
These problems are not mere abstractions. In July
2011, Pakistan‟s The Daily Post reported that between
2006 and 2011, terrorist attacks in Islamabad claimed
the lives of 40 security guards and seriously wounded
18 (Hassan, 2011). The murdered security guards
worked at the Marriott Hotel (in one such attack 17
guards were killed); a car park at Islamabad
International Airport (the guard was the only victim);
and restaurants and cafes (Howie, 2012: 143).
There is an incredible paradox at the heart of the
security guard industry, especially when they stand
guard at sites that are highly desirable targets to wouldbe terrorists. We routinely ask these low-paid and
undervalued workers to be on the frontline of some of
our most important security operations. In some
circumstances, we ask some of society‟s lower paid
workers to save some of society‟s highest paid workers
(as was the case on 9/11, see DiMarco, 2007; Howie,
2012: 133-154; Parfomak, 2004). Parfomak‟s (2004)
US congressional report discussed some alarming
realities:
In the US in 2003, around one million security
guards were employed and were being paid an
average full-time, annual salary of $19,400.
This salary places security guards well below
the average annual salary across all
occupations in the US.
There were only 650,000 police officers during
this same year being paid on average more
than double that of security guards.
Organizations and agencies responsible for
counter-terrorism paid little attention to the
security guard management practices in private
companies, even when those private companies
were responsible for the security of important
public locations.
It was „an open question‟ as to whether
companies that employ security guards at
vulnerable locations „have hired, trained, and
otherwise supported security guards to the
degree warranted by the social value‟ of the
places they are stationed to protect (Parfomak,
2004: 1. My emphasis).
Intelligence indicated that it was likely that
terrorist organizations pay close attention to
the practices and behaviors of security guards
at locations they are considering as targets.
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What right do we have to expect underpaid and
undervalued workers to protect us when terrorists
strike? Surely, security guards would have little reason
to risk their lives in defending strangers from becoming
victims of terrorism. Yet, evidence from the 9/11
attacks suggest that security guards will be nothing
short of heroic when required. Gabriel Torres, a
security guard in building 5 of the World Trade Center,
risked his life to save others and saw many of his
colleagues do the same. He rang his mother to tell her
he was okay, but also to tell his wife and son that he
loved them since he was about to risk his life in
performing his job – „I gotta do what I gotta do‟ (in
DiMarco, 2007: 101). Gabriel saw his colleagues
running into one of the Towers as it collapsed to the
ground. Ralph Blasi, a security manager working in a
building across the street, had often asked his guards
what they would do if there was a disaster and dead
bodies littered the streets. „The consensus was always
that they would run‟ (Blaisi in Fink & Mathias, 2002:
57). But on 9/11, guards did not run. Blaisi had 60
guards working for him that day. Not one ran. On the
contrary, they guided 45 thousand people out of
Manhattan, saving countless lives. Then, there is the
story of Rick Rescorla – a security manager working in
one of the Towers. He ignored security advice that his
building was not at risk and evacuated, saving the lives
of almost 3000 workers. Unfortunately, Rescorla died
in the Towers‟ collapse. He kept running back into the
Towers to save as many people as possible (Wisloski,
2011, and see rickrescorla.com).
Security guards play a vital role in the tourism
industry. They are ubiquitous features of travel – in
airports, hotels, resorts, events, and monuments – and
important contributors to travellers‟ perceptions of
safety and security. With the significant threat that
terrorism poses to the tourism industry, security guards
are asked to play important roles in tourism counterterrorism functionality.

Imagining Security Guards in Popular
Culture
As Momus (in Žižek, 2014: 141-142) argues, „Certain
scenarios in the real world can be as absurd as jokes,
self-evidently laughable, no matter how tragic they
are‟. He argues that „Comedy is a legitimacy crisis
followed by the sudden appearance of a cornucopia‟.
Security guards occupy an ambivalent place in
contemporary society. We often imagine security
guards as figures of failure, the subjects of jokes and
humiliation. When they are not viewed as satirical
under-achievers, they are often viewed as dangerous
and potentially violent members of the social fringe,
~ 43 ~

criminalistic and uncertain. Indeed, security guards are
pilloried in many different forms of popular culture.
The Southern Californian, pro-marijuana legalization
music group, Kottonmouth Kings, included a song on
their 2004 album condemning security guards for their
violent tactics for crowd control especially against
younger people, their aggression, and their paradoxical
desire for power but low social standing:
All these security guards, running around
shows always acting hard.
Why can‟t we get along, party all night until the
break of dawn.
Why don‟t you leave us alone? …
Acting like you‟re a cop but you ain‟t got no
badge.
Trying to take my pot then you‟re getting a toe
tag.
Searching people‟s pockets, acting like a true
jake.
I can see you buying steroids with your
minimum wage („Leave us alone‟,
Kottonmouth Kings, 2004).
Media reports on security guards often highlight
criminality, delinquent behavior, and violence. In
scholarly circles, studies of security guards are often
housed in criminological discourses where the
emphasis is on security guard‟s role as an appendage to
legitimate policing forces and organizations or as
private police – a literal replacement for the inability of
police forces to deliver reliable public safety. In
Australia, this was a significant concern during the
Commonwealth Games in Melbourne in 2006 where
security workers and guards significantly outnumbered
police force members (Ker & Murphy, 2006). In the
lead-up to the Games, there was considerable public
debate about the role of security guards in public
safety. After revelations that the original tender for
Commonwealth Games security had failed to elicit a
large enough pool of applicants in a timely fashion
leading to a re-issue of the tender months before the
Games began, security analyst Myles Newlove (2005)
argued that
You‟re going to have security guards being
used in the Commonwealth Games that are illequipped and not trained to a level that is
required for searching of vehicles for explosive
devices.
This debate was framed in discourses of security guard
criminality. An Australian sporting personality had
been killed the previous year by an over-zealous
security guard at a Melbourne hotel. Criminality and
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incompetence were almost assumed, and many believe
that the Melbourne Commonwealth Games were
vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
A November 2010 report by the labour union
representing security guards in Australia, the Liquor,
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union
(LHMU) (renamed United Voice in 2011) tells a
similar story. They suggest that the demand for
security guards spurred by the threat of terrorism to
Western cities has led to the market becoming flooded
with „rogue‟ providers that have set off „a ferocious
price war‟ that has seen quality of security guards drop
significantly. Profits in the security guard industry have
subsequently been made by „cutting corners‟ through
understaffing, enforcing excessive working hours, lax
regulation of health and safety, and by hiring
dangerously unqualified, untrained guards (LHMU,
2010: 6; Howie, 2012: 142). In the report there are
many examples of media stories depicting weak and
ineffective security. The following is a selection of
headings from articles recently published in Australian
newspapers:

buildings in New York City were easy targets of
antihero Patrick Bateman‟s frustrations. He
unnecessarily kills a guard in a building he mistakenly
enters. This is a metaphor for sameness and a social
commentary on the horror of an indistinguishable
identity and insignificance, something apparently
exemplified by security guards – every building has
them, and they pass by mostly unnoticed.
Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009) tells the story of security
guard Paul Blart (played by Kevin James), who works
in a large shopping complex in New Jersey. I argue
that the portrayal of security guards in this movie
typifies the place of security guards in the social
imagination. Paul Blart is white, overweight, and
unmanly. His comedic buffoonery, incompetence, and
failure to be a real cop is the context for his
transformation from loser to unlikely hero. In a telling
scene, Paul Blart is showing a new guard the
procedures for protecting the mall:
Blart: Hey. Paul Blart. Ten-year veteran.
Sims: Wow. Veck Sims.
Blart: Well, Veck Sims, welcome to the show.
Let‟s mount up … So what made you want to
pursue security?

Concerns organised crime infiltrating private
security firms
Security guards reprimanded for undue force

Sims: I never finished high school. This is all I
could get (Carr, 2009; Drew‟s Script-O-Rama,
no date).

Security chief faces drugs, firearm charges
Security laws bent to allow brazen rorting
Private police out of control
Guilty plea on unlicensed security
Elderly man thrown out of Sunshine hospital
after complaining about wait
Security firm flouting laws
Student sues for „slavery‟: $200 for 158 hours
work
Security operator stole $390,000 (LHMU,
2010: 5, 18, 21-26, 31, 42).
Popular culture seemingly views security guards as a
fringe, unruly and dangerous species. Quick to anger,
poor and unsophisticated, useless and ultimately
expendable. In films they are often killed with little
concern or consequence. In The Matrix (1999) security
guards are slaughtered en masse whilst doing nothing
more than performing their jobs. The metaphor of „the
agents‟ becomes one of expendability. As Morpheus
explains to Neo, „The Matrix is a system, Neo. That
system is our enemy . . . these people are still part of
that system and that makes them our enemy„. In
American Psycho (2000) security guards in large
~ 44 ~

The suggestion that being a security guard is evidence
of failure, of being a drop-out, is quickly negated as it
becomes apparent that Sims is that other form of
security guard in the social imagination; the criminal.
Betraying his colleagues, Sims violently takes control
of the mall and holds several employees as hostages.
He assembles a group of social misfits at the same
social level as the security guard – a skater punk, a
BMX rider, and tattooed and pierced young people.
Paul Blart is the only man willing to stand up to these
social misfits and resist, despite being hopelessly
untrained and incompetent. As his manager reminds
him,
Listen, I think you‟re making a big mistake.
SWAT‟s on the way. And I‟m not gonna
sugarcoat it, you‟re untrained, you‟re unarmed.
And let‟s face it, son, you present a huge target
(Carr, 2009; Drew‟s Script-O-Rama, no date).
His personal transformation is mirrored by a popcultural reflection on the roles of security guards and a
realization that it is an „undervalued job‟ but „an
honorable task‟ (Plotz, 2013: 173). The metaphor is
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then tripled as his awakening is depicted via his
pathway from femininity to white masculinity. The
film‟s message is that there are, apparently, no small
roles in this life – only small white men. Paul Blart is
able to reclaim his masculinity and redeem his life
from the supposed obvious inferiority of his profession.
The film reminds viewers that security guards may be
expected to be heroes when circumstances call for it.
Indeed, Paul Blart realizes his value, his role, and is
able to save the day in true Hollywood fashion by
faking incompetence. In this crucial scene Paul Blart
pretends during a fist fight to succumb to his Achilles
heel – he pretends to faint due to hypoglycemia. In the
moment when the bad guy relaxes believing Blart is
defeated, he administers a vicious sweep kick that
takes the villain down.
Žižek (2014: 88-89) has made a similar argument in
relation to George W. Bush‟s presidency and Dan
Quayle‟s Vice-Presidency. He argues that Bush‟s
„slips‟ – those many moments when he would say
something odd, wrong or ill-considered – may actually
be psychoanalytic „supreme slips‟, thereby providing
more truth than any ordinary, “correct”, language could
ever hope to. The secret psychoanalytic twist is that
incompetence is the ideal place for genius to hide. You
can achieve a lot when people expect little from you.
As Žižek (2014: 89) explains, these slips:
. . . get a little bit more interesting when pure
tautology is emphatically offered as a causal
explanation; see the following slip of Quayle:
“When I have been asked who caused the riots
and the killing in Los Angeles, my answer has
been direct and simple: Who is to blame for the
riots? The rioters are to blame. Who is to blame
for the killing? The killers are to blame.
Žižek (2014: 89) notes that whilst this explanation was
unacceptable to many and was ridiculed in some
circles, there is a strong tenant of conservative, neoliberal ideology that supports it – systemic forces are
not to blame for violence. Individuals are. They should
be responsible for their actions! Bush Junior, for his
part, gave the world this oddity – „I believe we are on
an irreversible trend towards more freedom and
democracy – but that could change‟ (in Žižek, 2014:
90). Bush‟s slip contains a flawless ideological logic.
Freedom and democracy is irreversible, until it isn‟t. A
similar twist can be found in a Futurama (1999-2013)
episode where the robot, Bender, meets God in space.
Bender asks, „So do you know I‟m going to do
something before I do it?‟ God responds, „Yes‟.
Bender, unsatisfied, quizzes, „What if I do something
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else?‟ God plainly replies, „Then I don‟t know
that‟ (Dietter, 2002). An action is only real once it has
happened. Before it has happened it is in a state of
quantum uncertainty. God only knows what we will do,
not what we don‟t do.
It is in this context that we should understand the final
ironic twist in Paul Blart: Mall Cop (2009). Blart is
assisted by his security manager to neutralize the final
bad guy – a member of the police SWAT team – who
is also a bully from Blart‟s high school – yet another
metaphor portraying security guards as social losers
and non-security others as successful „winners‟. As
viewers we are led to believe that a police officer has
shot this mastermind of the mall siege, but as the
camera pans back we learn that a security guard has
taken the policeman‟s gun from his holster and
delivered the triumphant bullet. The films‟ message is
clear – police officers will often be looked on to
provide public safety as first responders, but security
guards are already there, already keeping you safe.
They are the first first responders.

Conclusion: Who is Responsible for our
Safety?
Korstanje and Clayton (2012: 11) argue that tourism
managers and terrorist organizations share something
in common; „Both tourism and terrorism rely on media
management; the creation and manipulations of beliefs
and perceptions‟. Similarly, security often has more to
do with providing the appearance and feeling of safety
than providing actual, physical security. Indeed,
security guards are mostly employed to deter
vandalism, prevent minor violence and damage. In
short, to keep the peace, broadly defined. They cannot
use violence, are often unarmed, and have little hope of
stopping a determined criminal or terrorist. This is
especially the case for suicide bombers. Denying a
suicide bomber entry to a building or secured site will
likely result in their device being detonated amidst
security guards or some other crowded, public area.
We ask security guards to preserve the safety of others
and it has sometimes cost them their lives.
The words security guard carry particular, often
negative, connotations. It implies refusal of entry,
illegitimate control of public space, and the unlawful
use of force. However, we hope that when disaster
strikes, security guards will help, perhaps even come to
our rescue as they did on 9/11. If their actions on that
day are any indication, then security guards will be
heroes when the unthinkable happens – a major
terrorist strike in a large city. This may even involve
guiding the wealthiest and most affluent members of

International Journal of Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage

Volume 2(i), 2014

the business world to safety and working hand-in-hand
with policing and emergency services in saving
thousands of lives. We hope they will do this despite
the fact that they are low-paid and enjoy low social
status. That is, perhaps, a big ask.
Leaders and managers working in the tourism industry
should consider the consequences of having low-paid,
highly stressed, under-valued security guards in their
employ (United Voice, 2011: 32). There are two sides
to this coin
1) Will cheap security provide effective protection?
and
2) Is it morally acceptable to ask low-paid workers to
risk their lives when their job calls for it?
There are many precedents in industry where security
guards are sometimes highly trained and well paid – at
defence sites; at government and other important
buildings and locations; at some sporting events;
cultural and religious events; at nuclear, power and
water facilities; and in war-zones. It could be argued
that there are many circumstances where highly
effective security guards are essential. Why are sites of
tourism not among them? It is a challenging question
for which there may often be very good answers –
perhaps your corner of the tourism industry is lowprofile; in a non-volatile location; does not regularly
see mass gatherings of people; or a host of other
reasons. Whilst a security over-reaction would provide
terrorism with an unnecessary role in what would be an
over-anxious life, we should also remember that
preventing terrorism is never just the responsibility of
government and policing agencies. And we should all
be mindful of the well-being of those who are
responsible for our safety, especially when they are
security guards employed in private companies.

References
Associated Free Press [AFP] (2014), „Town‟s Horror‟,
Herald Sun, 18 June, p. 27.
Alexander, D. (2004), Business Confronts Terrorism: Risks
and Responses, Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press.
Alexander, Y. and Alexander, D. (2002), Terrorism and
Business: The Impact of September 11, 2001, Ardsley:
Transnational Publishers.
BBC News (2005), „Toll climbs in Egyptian attacks‟, BBC
News, 23 July, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/4709491.stm, retrieved on 15 March 2010.
Bhattarai, K., Conway, D. & Shrestha, N. (2005), „Tourism,
Terrorism and Turmoil in Nepal‟, Annals of Tourism
Research, 32(3), 669-688.

~ 46 ~

Carlson, T. (1995), „Safety Inc.‟, Policy Review, 73, 66-76.
Carr, S. (2009), Paul Blart: Mall Cop, Culver City, CA:
Happy Madison Productions.
Coaffee, J. (2003), Terrorism, Risk, and the City: The
Making of a Contemporary Urban Landscape, Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Dietter, S. (2002), „Godfellas‟, Futurama, season 4, episode
8, Los Angeles: The Curiosity Company and 20 th Century
Fox Television.
DiMarco, D. (2007), Tower Stories: An Oral History of
9/11, Santa Monica: Santa Monica Press.
Drew‟s Script-O-Rama (no date), „Paul Blart: Mall Cop
script – Dialogue transcript‟, available at http://
www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/p/paul-blart-mallcop-script.html, retrieved on 25 June 2104.
Hassan, A. (2011), „Private security guards worst victim of
terrorism‟, Daily Times, 14 June, available at http://
www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\06\14
\story_, retrieved on 19 August 2011.
Henderson, J. (2003), „Terrorism and tourism: Managing the
consequences of the Bali bombings‟, Journal of Travel &
Tourism Marketing, 15(1), 41-58.
Henderson, J. (2004), „Managing the aftermath of terrorism:
The Bali bombings, travel advisories and Singapore‟,
International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism, 4(2), 1731.
Hitchcock, M. and Putra, I. (2007), Tourism, Development
and Terrorism in Bali, Hampshire: Ashgate.
Howie, L. (2009a), Terrorism, the Worker and the City:
Simulations and Security in a Time of Terror, Surrey:
Gower/Ashgate.
Howie, L. (2009b), „The terrorism threat and managing
workplaces‟, Disaster Prevention and Management, 16
(1), 70-78.
Howie, L. (2012), Witnesses to Terror: Understanding the
Meanings and Consequences of Terrorism, Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Howie, L. (2013), „Witnessing terrorism‟, Journal of
Sociology, online first, available at http://
j o s . s a g e p u b . c o m / c o n t e n t /
early/2014/01/23/1440783313518246.abstract, retrieved
on 17 June 2014.
Jansen, B. (2014), „FAA projects steady growth in more
people flying more miles‟, USA Today, 13 March,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
business/2014/03/13/faa-airline-passengergrowth/6365039/, retrieved on 12 June 2014.
Jenkins, B. (2001), Protecting Public Surface
Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: An
Executive Overview, San Jose: The Mineta Transportation
Institute, College of Business, San José State University.

Howie

Security Guards and Counter-terrorism

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (eds.) (2006), Plural Policing: A
Comparative Perspective, East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Ker, P. and Murphy, M. (2006), „Victoria forked out $119m
for security‟, The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March,
available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/commonwealth
-games/victoria-forked-out-119m-forsecurity/2006/03/28/1143441129458.html, retrieved on
23 June 2014.
Korstanje, M. (2009), „Re-visiting risk perception theory in
the context of travel‟, e-Review of Tourism Research, 7
(4), 68-81.
Korstanje, M. and Clayton, A. (2012), „Tourism and
terrorism: Conflicts and commonalities‟, Worldwide
Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 8-25.
Kottonmouth Kings (2004), „Leave us alone‟, from the
album Fire It Up, Burbank, CA: Suburban Noize
Records.
Loader, I. (2000), „Plural policing and democratic
governance‟, Social & Legal Studies, 9(3), 323-345.
Mansfeld, Y. (1999), „Cycles of war, terror, and peace:
Determinants and management of crisis and recovery of
the Israeli tourism industry‟, Journal of Travel Research,
38(1), 30-40.
Mawby, R. (2000), „Tourists‟ perceptions of security: The
risk-fear paradox‟, Tourism Economics, 6(2), 109-121.
Mueller, J. (2006), Overblown: How Politicians and the
Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and
Why we Believe Them, New York: Free Press.
Newlove, M. (2005), „Questions raised over Commonwealth
Games security‟, The 7.30 Report, interviewed by M.
Gearin, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1435813.htm,
retrieved on 23 June 2014.
Parfomak, P. (2004), Guarding America: Security Guards
and U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection, 12 November,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
Pizam, A. and Mansfeld, Y. (1996), Tourism, Crime and
International Security Issues, London: John Wiley &
Sons.
Pizam, A. and Smith, G. (2000), „Tourism and terrorism: A
quantitative analysis of major terrorist acts and their
impact on tourism destinations‟, Tourism Economics, 6
(2), 123-138.
Plotz, B. (2013), „Paul Blart and the decline of white,
working-class masculinities‟, Fat Studies, 2(2), 173-182.
Sarre, R. and Prenzler, T. (1998), „Regulating private
security in Australia‟, Trends and Issues in Crime and
Criminal Justice, November, 98, 1-6.
Sarre, R. and Prenzler, T. (2000), „The relationship between
police and private security: Models and future direction‟,
International Journal of Comparative and Applied
Criminal Justice, 24(1), 91-113.

~ 47 ~

Sarre, R. and Prenzler, T. (2011), Private Security and
Public Interest: Exploring Private Security Trends and
Directions for Reform in the New Era of Plural Policing,
ARC Report, April.
Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (1983), „Private security:
Implications for social control‟, Social Problems, 30(5),
493-506.
Skoll, G. (2010), Social Theory of Fear: Terror, Torture,
and Death in a Post-Capitalist World, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Sönmez, S., Apostolopoulos, Y. and Tarlow, P. (1999),
„Tourism in crisis: Managing the effects of terrorism‟,
Journal of Travel Research, 38(1), 13-18.
Sönmez, S. and Graefe, A. (1998), „Influence of terrorism
risk on foreign tourism decisions‟, Annals of Tourism
Research, 25(1), 112-144.
Stafford, G., Yu, L. and Armoo, A. (2002), „Crisis
management and recovery how Washington, D.C., hotels
responded to terrorism‟, The Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 43(5), 27-40.
St. John, P. (1991), Air Piracy, Airport Security, and
International Terrorism: Winning the War Against
Hijackers, New York: Quorum Books.
Stossel, S. (2014), My Age of Anxiety: Fear, Hope, Dread
and the Search for Peace of Mind, London: William
Heinemann.
Toohey, K., Taylor, T. and Lee, C. (2003), „The FIFA World
Cup 2002: The effects of terrorism on sport tourists‟,
Journal of Sport & Tourism, 8(3), 186-196.
United Voice (2011), Security Failure: Preventing Another
9/11, report by United Voice, the security union. North
Melbourne, VIC.
van Steden, R. and Nalla, M. (2010), „Citizen satisfaction
with private security guards in the Netherlands:
Perceptions of an ambiguous occupation‟, European
Journal of Criminology, 7(3), 214-234.
Wisloski, J. (2011), „A family remembers: Hero of 9/11
gave life to save thousands‟, Yahoo! News, 9 September,
available at http://news.yahoo.com/a-family-remembers-hero-of-9-11-gave-life-to-save-thousands.html, retrieved
on 5 January 2012.
Žižek, S. (2014), Žižek’s Jokes (Did You Hear the One
About Hegel and Negation?), ed. by A. Mortensen,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

